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Opportunity Calls:
The Moral Economy During Existential Economic Transition in the Ural
Mountains and Appalachia, 1991- 2008
Nora Springer ’20
The frenzied sale of vouchers on street corners, the constantly fluctuating prices on essentials
like bread, the intimate fear of growing lawlessness – it is difficult to imagine the panic of Moscow in
the late 1990s. The entire country was up for grabs in the world’s largest fire sale. After the defeat of
communist Gennady Zyuganov by Boris Yeltsin in 1996, it was clear that Russia was set on an
irreversible course to capitalism. However, in order to achieve a capitalist economy, the entire nation of
Russia needed to privatize. While small business had been allowed to prosper under Gorbachev, every
meaningful industry and corporation was still nationalized at the time of Russian privatization in the
late 1990s.
Even minor property considered “personal” in most capitalist societies now needed to officially
be recognized as such. This personal privatization was extremely dangerous. In 2000, the Moscow militia
had compiled a 3,000-name file of elderly people who had gone missing within a month of privatizing
their apartments.1 When it came to the privatization of massive oil, telecommunications, construction,
and other essential corporations, the scale of corruption, intimidation, and fraud employed to make
money was staggering. While it may be initially assumed that members of the Soviet criminal class
became this new capitalist Mafiosos, the evidence does not show this to be true. Black marketeers did
not expand in the new economy, but remained in a small-scale underground economy. Disturbingly, it
was young members of the Komosol, formerly upstanding citizens like Mikhail Khordokovsky, who
proved the most brutal and most cunning in the race to make money from the new capitalism.2
To make matters even worse, this sale was happening at a real discount. The severe undervaluing
of Russian assets exacerbated the disruption of Russian society caused by transition. In 1996, the entire
Russian economy was valued at ten billion U.S. dollars.3 This figure included 6% of the world’s total oil
wells, expansive industrial infrastructure, and 15% of the world’s wheat exports.4 One American hedge
fund manager reported making 1,500% returns for his investors in only four years from 1996 to 2000,
despite the collapse of the ruble in 1998. None of these particular investors were Russians or even
Eastern Europeans. Instead, this hedge fund represented a coalition of powerful Western billionaires.5
Meanwhile, in Appalachia, steel mills and coal mines were shuttering by the day. After a steady
period of decline during the 1980s, the introduction of subsidized Chinese steel to the American market
meant that production costs in American manufacturing were simply too high to be sustainable.6 Unlike
in Russia, the beginning of this transition was not any America's idea of liberalism – the air in
Appalachia was tinged with mourning, the loss of a lifestyle, the closing of the only good jobs the region
had ever known.7 Over time, however, new hope began to emerge in the region. Transition, like in the
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Urals, became characterized as an opportunity – a chance for a brighter future in the historically
disenfranchised mountains.
In both Appalachia and Russia, decision makers prioritized certain goals and data metrics over
others, often painting an incomplete portrait of economic transition, and, in some cases, causing serious
harm. During the transition of Russia to capitalism, the goals of privatization began with optimistic
fervor as a democratic spirit swept the country. Over time, however, the goals of privatization shifted to
practicality, especially protecting and encouraging the interests of Western investors. In Appalachia,
economic transition began as a matter of practicality: steel and coal companies were leaving for cheaper
labor in China. However, transition came to be viewed as an opportunity to integrate working class
Appalachians into the professional knowledge economy. In the Urals and Appalachia, the privileging of
different forms of data served as metrics for the accomplishment of different goals. In both transitions,
one word keeps coming up: opportunity. As Russia privatized and Appalachia professionalized,
practical business interests interacted with political optimism in dynamic and constantly renegotiated
ways. In this paper, I will analyze the rhetoric of transition delivered by decision makers in two major
sections. In the first, I will analyze the goals of economic transition in both Russia and Appalachia. Here,
the question of economic opportunity will be considered as both an opportunity to liberalize and
improve society, and an opportunity to generate profit for businesses and investors.
I. Good Work: The Transition to Capitalism in Russia and the Moral Economy
After the collapse of communism in Russia, the goal for the Yelstin government may seem
obvious: transition to capitalism. This goal was not, however, as straightforward as it appears at first
glance. For a country that had spent seven decades under a communist system, everything was in
question. How would the country transition to capitalism? How would the country know when it had
achieved “capitalism”? What did Russian capitalism even mean? Would Russian capitalism look like the
one in the United States, or maybe more Scandinavian, or possibly an entirely new invention? As
reformist spirit swept Russia, and Westerners excited for a new, potentially democratic nation, debate
over what it meant to be “capitalist” and how “capitalism” would be measured, raged on, with different
actors presenting and advocating for different ideas of success.
Nearly all of these actors placed success within the context of a moral or just economy, and
especially an economy that was productive in creating a better culture. Ideas of moral economy can be
traced to the eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers, Adam Smith and David Hume, who had
envisioned a “civil society,” including business and economic sectors that would help raise peasants from
feudalism.8 Moral economy has since been interpreted in both descriptive and prescriptive ways. Some
scholars argue that the moral economy, or the idea that economies also push society forward, is a natural
function of economic life, while others argue that it is not always but should be a function of economic
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life.9 Irrespective of whether the moral economy is generally prescriptive or descriptive, during Russian
privatization, ideas of the moral economy were both inescapable and taken for granted.
To many economists, especially in the early years of Russian transition, privatization was not
considered an end in and of itself. Instead, depoliticization of the economy was taken to be the ultimate
goal of privatization. Economists under this paradigm especially focused on the need to cut production
costs, break up the consolidation of managerial power by former Komosol members, and reduce
subsidies to incentivize restructuring.10 It was assumed that the removal of politics from business would
essentially lead to the creation of a more democratic, freer, and more transparent state. The International
Monetary Fund in particular encouraged depoliticization measures, differentiated from and above
privatization efforts.11
However, nowhere is this principle of moral economy seen more starkly than in the writings of
Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. Gaidar was a 35-year-old theorist only beginning to make a name
for himself by publishing papers on potential avenues for Russian reform when Yeltsin shockingly
appointed him, and then kept promoting him to important advisory roles.12 Chubais was an economist
who had convened a study group in Leningrad of the like-minded liberal capitalist reformers, and had
been poached by Gaidar for his radical ideas. As ideas of privatization developed into rapid economic
change, members of the Leningrad group moved from an advisory capacity to increasingly political and
policy-oriented roles. However, the informal Leningrad group was made up of bright young students
running econometric models of micro-sized Gorbachev small business economies, not policy experts
prepared to construct an entirely new economic system for one of the world’s largest countries. 13 The
harshest critics of the Leningrad group focus on their elite disconnect from the conditions faced by
ordinary people. Marshall Goodman argued that the Gaidar reforms were, “little more than classroom
exercises. It came as no surprise, therefore, when they resulted in widespread economic hardship.” 14
Aleksandr Rutskoi, Yeltsin’s vice president, similarly referred to the group as “urchins in pink shorts and
yellow sneakers.”15 Whether or not the Leningrad group were schoolboys playing at power, they
certainly imagined themselves as great, moral reformers of a corrupt political system and defunct culture.
Gaidar and Chubais co-authored the pamphlet Crossroads in Modern Russian History
consistently appealing to ideas of moral economy, especially opposing oligarchic control in favor of
more liberal, democratic policies. They make these arguments even though they came from ostensibly
the technical discipline of mathematical economics, not anthropology or political science, which are
normally associated with issues of moral political economy. In Crossroads, they argued especially using
the Svyazinvest case. An auction was held to privatize Svyazinvest, Russia’s largest telecommunications
company. As Chubais and Gaidar describe it:
The argument was simple: would the company go to the higher bidder at an honest auction, or
to its owner ‘by the unspoken rules?’ The position of the reform wing of the government
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(primarily Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and Oleg Sysuev) was unilateral: the privatization
of Svyazinvest had to guarantee the separation of business from government and the formation
of a system in which the rules of the game are the same for everyone. The position of an
influential part of the oligarchs was different: this was a change in the rules of the game that they
did not accept.16
Gaidar and Chubais describe their economic decisions using moral terms. They continued to
argue that the Svyazinvest case applied more generally to the goals of economic transition in Russia,
claiming:
This proved that our [Russian] government could guarantee equal conditions for opposing
business groups, not be the agent of any one group, and stand above when necessary. The clash
of the government and the oligarchs in 1997 remains one of the first successful attempts at
changing the character of Russian capitalism by separating government from property.17
Gaidar and Cubais support the IMF in moralizing depoliticization measures. Later, they go on
to say they regret that the “nascent middle class suffered the most from the [1998 Ruble collapse]
crisis.”18 In their writings, the two men seem in touch with the needs of ordinary families and sensitive
to the particular damages caused by rapid economic change.
In their description of battling the oligarchs, Chubais and Gaidar appeal to ideals of fairness,
cultural reform, and impartiality. The two economic theorists, described most derisively as essentially
out of touch math nerds, were actually deeply invested in the impact of the economy on morality,
culture, and Russian identity. During the crisis that rapid economic transition became in Russia,
traditional disciplinary roles did not hold up. Academics learned in abstract mathematical economics
could, in only a short number of years, become politicians now equally bent wielding the economy as a
moral tool.
II. Investment or Encroachment: The View of Western Financers in Moscow
Perhaps the most notorious of Westerners in Moscow is New York Times bestselling author and
hedge fund manager Bill Browder. His book Red Notice swept American bookstores, promising to tell
the story of the sole, brave American who stood strong against oppressive Russian oligarchs. By
Browder’s account, he alone defended the country from the tyranny of Vladimir Putin’s cronies (all
while making millions and marrying a “slender Russian vixen”).19 To Browder, the goal of transitioning
Russia to capitalism was to inculcate a culture of hard work and democratic agency. He argues:
Seventy years of communism had destroyed the work ethic of an entire nation. Millions of
Russians had been sent to the gulags for showing the slightest hint of personal initiative. The
Soviets severely penalized independent thinkers, so the natural self-preservation reaction was to
do as little as possible and hope that nobody would notice you. This had been fed into the
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psyches of ordinary Russians from the moment they were on their mothers’ breasts. To run a
Western-style business, therefore, you either had to completely brainwash a fresh young Russian
about the virtues of efficiency and clear thinking or find some miraculous person whose natural
psychology had somehow defied the pressures of communism.20
Browder presented a popularized and updated version of an old Cold War idea – that capitalism
will naturally create more democratic, healthier cultural value systems for the oppressed and repressed
Russian people. It is unclear how much Browder actually knew about Russian culture. Despite ten years
in Russia, he did speak even basic Russian and required the constant use of a translator. 21 In the entire
length of his monograph, he rarely referred to Russian culture, government, or values in positive terms.
Browder framed the need to make Russians harder working and more democratic not as a
benefit to ordinary Russian people, but primarily as a benefit to Western investors. In his book,
significant attention is paid to the need for a rule of law in Russia. He describes a scandal when the
Russian oligarch Potanin doubled the available shares of his oil company, Sidanco, accessible to anybody
except for Browder’s fund, Hermitage Investments. Hermitage had invested heavily in Sidanco in the
past. This prohibition meant that Browder’s investment in Sidanco was cut into half overnight. Browder
claims that the reason for this move by Potanin was “that a group of unconnected foreigners also had a
big financial success [in Russian privatization] was unbearable to them. This was simply not supposed
to happen. It was not … Russian.”22 He then goes on to criticize at length the difficulties with establishing
respect for the law and proper bureaucratic channels in post-communist Russia, usually framing the
problem in the context of the victimization of foreigners by the Russian oligarchs and political leaders.
To him, the primary goals of transition were establishing rule of law, inculcating capitalist values,
reducing investment risk, and reigning in the influence of oligarchs. All of these goals were geared to the
benefit of Western investors.23
Red Notice was written for a popular audience, and it reads like a James Bond novel. The
Russians are overwhelming the villains, and Browder positions himself as an American hero. He
consistently contrasts himself with the emerging oligarch class, although it is not clear how he, a man
who made millions essentially acting as a vulture on undervalued assets, is meaningfully more ethical in
practice. Despite the book’s shocking shortcomings, Browder helped to define American attitudes
towards the moral economy in Russia. It is telling that Browder sees profit making in Russia, and
especially profit making for Westerners in Russia, as a moral enterprise. Browder is exemplary of a
particular class of American investors who helped to define both the usefulness of the Russian economy
both for societal betterment and for money making. To Browder, the moral and the profitable economy
are not two separate ideas.
The idea that Russian privatization and capitalism should be primarily about attracting Western
advisors is given much more serious treatment by other writers too. In a comprehensive series of papers
published in the International Trade and Business Law Review that focused on the opportunities
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provided by the privatizing oil industry, the purpose of privatization is again assumed to be the financial
gain for Western investors. The report identifies the main barrier to Western investment and developing
full “Russian capitalism” in the energy industry resulting from the undue power given to politicians,
and especially their personal connections with oligarchs that often exclude foreigners. 24 The report
identifies specific policy changes that would allow for more Western investment in the energy sector,
especially focused on minimizing risk caused by volatile political conditions. The first and most
important recommendation is to limit the ability of Russian politicians to indirectly expropriate energy
companies. Although direct expropriation was made illegal without adequate compensation and due
cause, local governments developed a system where the state crept into ownership through stringent
regulations on foreign wealth investment. The report argues for a law forcing local governments to
compensate for reductions in property value.25 The second recommendation is that tax laws be reformed
to stop the double taxation, both local and federal, that most energy companies are subject to as a result
of the specific historical circumstances of energy nationalization during the early Soviet period. 26
Together, this report, as does Browder’s book, reflected the attitude that encouraging Western
investment was part and parcel of a moral economy.
III. Silicon Holler: Unintended Consequences of Appalachia’s Tech Economy
After the complete collapse of the steel industry, Appalachia seemed poised to become the new
future of tech. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the relatively low cost of land, beautiful
scenery, and expansive area attracted the attention of multinational technology companies. It seemed
that investment from companies like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft could replace U.S. Steel,
Bethlehem Corporation, and Black Mountain Coal Company. Still, at the beginning of the high-tech
experiment in 1998, prospects for the Appalachian tech industry were, realistically, dismal. There was a
lack of both infrastructure and workers with an adequate knowledge base. As seen in the below graph,
both technology jobs and commensurate pay was lagging far behind the national average.
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Fig. 127

Tech publications were nevertheless excited about the potential in Appalachia. One Wired
article began with an optimistic sentence: “Scranton, Pennsylvania sits at the crossroads of the
technology revolution.”28 Technology in Appalachia seemed promising, and mutually beneficial for
companies who could access huge amounts of otherwise unused land at low cost and to transition the
region into the white-collar knowledge economy. A readymade work force however was not available in
Appalachia. Jim Cummings, the director of the Greater Scranton Chamber of Commerce, interviewed
in the same Wired article, outlined his city’s plan to attract more tech investment. He stated that many
Appalachians “are unprepared for work in the technology sector, forcing companies to bring mostly
jobs requiring low skill levels to these rural communities.”29 To Cummings, the problem is essentially
cultural. Appalachians had been insulated from the norms of white-collar professional employment
from a century of predominantly blue-collar work. By providing training in low skills, menial jobs like
call centers; the plan was that Appalachia would eventually accrue a critical mass of able white-collar
workers, thereby attracting better jobs in the tech sector. Interestingly, Cummings main worry was not
whether companies would actually follow through with higher paid work. Instead, he expressed concern
about the well-documented Appalachian brain drain. To him, the biggest obstacle facing the region was
young people moving far away for better prospects.30
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Jim Cumming’s vision for the tech industry as a civilizing force replacing blue collar work was
not a vernacular idea relegated to his small city. Instead, he echoed much of what mainstream America
thought of Appalachia. One grant writer, who oversaw projects to encourage tech investment through
the charitable Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, called the collapse of manufacturing “a terrifying
liberation.” BitSource, a startup operating in Pikesville, Kentucky, reported that they put a great deal of
effort into having mine workers become professional office employees. Rusty Justice, a BitSource
founder, said that he held frequent “reimagination trainings” where he told workers “quit thinking of
yourselves as unemployed coal workers, you’re technology workers.”31 BitSource remains today a
functioning Pikesville company focused especially on employing and giving professional training to
former coal workers, prioritizing those suffering from black lung.32
The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) was also part of this dialogue. ARC essentially
functions as an organization that both determines the boundaries of a moral economy in Appalachia
and helps investors determine what will make a profit in Appalachia. Established as part of the War on
Poverty in 1965, ARC both assists with the economy’s effect on society and provides mathematical
insights into Appalachian investment.33 Its mission statement is to “innovate, partner, and invest to
build community capacity and economic growth in Appalachia.” 34 The federal organization claims to
service three populations: the Appalachian people (and especially the poorest among them), “the
American taxpayer” (who, interestingly, is never imagined as an Appalachian), and any businesses
willing to invest in Appalachia.35 The organization thus exists as neither purely interested in business
profit, nor purely interested in bettering economic life and society, but exists in some negotiated
cooperation between the two.
ARC’s involvement in the burgeoning Appalachian tech industry was thus extensive. In
promotional material, ARC dramatically emphasized that tech companies involved in Appalachia were
“angel” investors. The implication was that they were willing to risk enormous sums of money on
difficult projects, and working in the interest of social good.36 The organization also lobbied for subsidies
to tech companies willing to invest in the region under the logic of professionalizing the workforce,
which passed through state legislatures.37 ARC established funds, hosted conferences, ran technology
education workshops for education professionals, and published case studies and reports on how to run
a successful Appalachian tech company.38 Between advocacy and subsidies, ARC helped to define not
only what the new Appalachian economy should look like, but also what would make money in the new
Appalachian economy.
Investment in the technology sector after the collapse of manufacturing is, truly, an example of
best intentions. In local op-eds and newspapers across the region, Appalachians expressed excitement
and optimism for a new tech future.39 People signed up for the educational programs in droves,
including especially workshops on coding in Kentucky.40 The plan for attracting higher paid and higher
skilled jobs by cultivating a culture of white-collar professionalism was eminently reasonable. It was not,
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however, successful. The tech companies did not come through with better work. Today, by some
metrics, West Virginia especially seems to be a booming tech center. The technology sector comprises
$2.5 billion of the state’s economy. Tech employment stands at 31,473.41 However, 62% of these
employees work in call centers. According to the West Virginia Bureau of Labor Statistics, call center
employees make an average of $25,020 a year. The average salary in West Virginia as a whole is $43,469
a year.42 As will be explored more deeply in section two, the data considered acceptable to use in
determining whether or not West Virginia has a “tech economy” reveals a great deal about the goals of
the West Virginia tech economy. In the end, tech in Appalachia served to employ at shockingly low
wages unskilled workers in highly isolated regions. Not to educate Appalachians as software engineers
and office managers.
In both the Appalachia and Ural Mountains region of Russia, although in somewhat different
ways, the goals of economic transition were characterized as an opportunity and cast in moral terms. At
first, the Appalachian economic transition was viewed as a matter of pragmatic economic necessity.
Increased production costs and the influx of cheap Chinese steel meant that Appalachia simply must
transition from an industrial economy.43 However, over time, the transition began to be viewed as an
opportunity, and by the early 2000s it constituted essentially a civilizing mission. Community leaders
argued that through the reduction of blue-collar jobs, Appalachia could develop a robust professional
culture, eventually leading to better and higher paid employment opportunities. Tech companies were
encouraged with tax breaks and positive press.44 However, on the ground, these opportunities failed to
manifest. Working class Appalachians continued to be funneled into low-wage, low-skill work, albeit in
an office setting. Tech companies were able to gain impressive access to a vulnerable working class
population by marketing ideas about the economy as a tool for just society.
The Ural Mountains region and Russia as a whole underwent a similar process. Although
initially viewed as an enormous opportunity and civilizing, democracy-promoting mission, transition to
capitalism over time began to be viewed in more pragmatic terms. As in Appalachia, “opportunity” had
a twofold meaning. The opportunity to make society better, and the opportunity to make a whole lot
of money. The goals of transition were increasingly cast as an opportunity for Western advisors to
generate enormous profit instead of an opportunity for Russian society to liberalize. Still, Western
advisors enjoyed moral legitimacy, were protected by the United States government, and were idolized
by Western media because of the idea that capitalism provided a moral economy in Russia. In both
regions, shock economic change resulted in an “all hands-on deck” crisis where institutional and
disciplinary boundaries were blurred, with traditional economists acting as policymakers and vice versa.
By analyzing the trajectory of goals set by these two transitions, we can see that the issues of
moral economy and economic pragmatism are not so easily differentiated in times of shocking and
sudden change. Instead, questions about “what society should be like” and “what is economically
profitable” are negotiated together over time, interacting in dynamic and evolving ways. Dialogues
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about the mathematical economy and the role of the economy in shaping society are often taken to be
two separate conversations, with discussions about a morally just economic system often assumed to be
fundamentally different from discussions about a profitable economic system.45 In cases where these
two conversations are treated together, scholars often point to the moral economy as a cynical tool for
profit hungry corporations by exploiting liberal ideas.46 However, in both the Urals Mountain region
and Appalachia, albeit in different ways, using the economy as a civilizing mission and using the
economy to make a profit were goals that mutually reinforced each other and grew together. While the
moral economy helped to set the boundaries for legitimate or desirable profit making, corporations and
financiers helped to reinforce and generate ideas of moral legitimacy. In normal times and in normal
places, it is often taken for granted that two different conversations about the economy are taking place.
On the one hand, sociologists and politicians debate “what the economy should do.” On the other hand,
economists and mathematicians debate “what will make a profit.” In these two instances of momentous
economic transitions, however, only one conversation took place: “what should make a profit.” In this
way, even at high levels of business and economics often assumed to be either impartial or coldly cynical,
morality was always a part of the equation.
IV. Conclusion
It is often assumed that economists and businessmen act outside of moral constraints, even in
times of existential economic crisis. The econometrics of Chubais and Gaidar, as well as the accounting
of Deloitte, have all been used to characterize engineers of economic transition as cold, academic, and
removed from reality. However, in both Appalachia and the Urals, mathematics about what will make
a profit is inextricable from moral questions of what should make a profit. The goals of economic
transition, and ideology about what economic transition should mean, were baked into the calculations
of both transitions. Further, the data used to determine the success or even reality of transition reveals
much about the goals of transition. In both Appalachia and the Urals, decision makers were far from
ideologically impartial. Instead, they created economic systems and privileged forms of profit based on
specific ideas about what the economy should be, how transition should develop, and the kinds of people
who should benefit.
In the Urals as in Appalachia, disruption of the economy during the late 1990s created new value
systems, leaching into workers’ interpersonal relationships and daily lives. Local, regional, and national
culture influenced beliefs about labor and laboring, attitudes that are often assumed by Westerners to
be constant, ahistorical, and universal across cultures. In actuality, the economic laws that govern
working life are not just abstract mathematical realities, but are also tied to questions of relationships,
social values, and cultural context.
The structure of the workplace and economy does not just manifest in abstract theories and
formulas, but has significant bearing on the “personal” lives of ordinary working people. While many
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Westerners would argue that any route which ends in capitalism over communism is worthwhile, most
ordinary Urals residents did not experience a wash of ideological joyousness at the triumph of a
democratic market economy, but did find new difficulties in relating to their bosses, confusing
workplace arrangements around such basics as scheduling, and an alien values system during transition.
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